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Abstract:  
In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an 
overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where 
households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The 
welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante (before ability is realized) expected (with respect to 
uninsurable productivity shocks) utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded 
in this welfare criterion is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks and redistribution among agents of different abilities. Such insurance and 
redistribution can be achieved by progressive labor income taxes or taxation of capital 
income, or both. The policy maker has then to trade off these concerns against the standard 
distortions these taxes generate for the labor supply and capital accumulation decision. 
 
We find that the optimal capital income tax rate is not only positive, but is significantly 
positive. The optimal (marginal and average) tax rate on capital is 36%, in conjunction with a 
progressive labor income tax code that is, to a first approximation, a flat tax of 23% with a 
deduction that corresponds to about $6,000 (relative to an average income of households in 
the model of $35,000). We argue that the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by 
the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax 
is due to the insurance and redistribution role of the income tax system. 
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Should the government tax capital income? The seminal contributions of Cham-
ley (1986) and Judd (1985) argue that standard economic theory provides a
negative answer to this question. The government should not tax capital, at
least not in the long run. The survey articles by Chari and Kehoe (1999) and
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) argue that this result is robust to a relaxation
of a number of stringent assumptions made by Chamley and Judd.
Chamley and Judd derive their result under the assumptions that house-
holds are in…nitely lived and face no risk (either aggregate or idiosyncratic),
or equivalently, can fully insure against idiosyncratic risk and trade a full set
of Arrow securities against aggregate uncertainty. If, on the other hand, idio-
syncratic risk is not insurable, Aiyagari (1995) suggests that positive capital
taxation may be optimal, in order to cure the overaccumulation of capital as a
result of precautionary savings behavior by households. His quantitative results
suggests, however, that the optimal capital income tax is small.1 Even if in-
surance markets are complete, or equivalently households face no idiosyncratic
risk, Hubbard and Judd (1997) demonstrate that …nancial market frictions in
the form of borrowing constraints may make the taxation of capital income
desirable.
Both the original Chamley-Judd result as well as its response by Aiyagari
relied on models with in…nitely lived agents. Characterizing the structure of
optimal taxes in a model that explicitly models the life cycle of households in
an overlapping generations economy, Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Garriga
(2003) demonstrate that the optimal capital income tax in general is di¤erent
from zero, at least if the tax code is anonymous in that the tax schedule a
household faces is not allowed to depend on the age of the household. It is an
open question, however, how large the optimal capital income tax, relative to
the optimal labor income tax is in a realistically calibrated life cycle model in
which households face borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic income risk in
the same order of magnitude as in the data.
The goal of this paper is therefore to quantitatively characterize the opti-
mal capital and labor income tax in a model that nests both model elements
previously identi…ed in the literature as having potential for generating positive
capital income taxes: imperfect insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks
due to missing insurance markets and borrowing constraints, as well as an ex-
plicit life cycle structure. In our model households di¤er according to their age
and their history of income realizations. In addition, we allow agents to be
heterogenous with respect to their initial ability to generate income, modelled
as a …xed e¤ect in their labor productivity. To the extent that society values
an equitable distribution of welfare this model element induces a positive role
for taxes that redistribute from the more to the less able households.
In order to determine the optimal tax system in our model with rich cross-
1Golosov et al. (2003) also argue, in a dynamic private information economy with idio-
syncratic income shocks, for an optimal capital income tax rate that is ex-post di¤erent from
zero, but still equal to zero in expectation for each household.
2sectional heterogeneity we need to take a stand on the social welfare function
employed in evaluating policies. The welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante
(before ability is realized) expected (with respect to uninsurable productivity
shocks) lifetime utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded
in this welfare criterion is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks and redistribution between agents of di¤erent ability, since
taking an extra dollar from the highly able and giving it to the less able, ceteris
paribus, increases social welfare since the value function characterizing lifetime
utility is strictly concave in ability to generate income.2 Such insurance and
redistribution can be achieved by progressive labor income taxes or taxation
of capital income (which mainly accrues to the wealthy), or both. The policy
maker then has to trade o¤ the concern against the standard distortions these
taxes impose on labor supply and capital accumulation decisions of households.
We …nd that the optimal capital income tax rate is not only positive, but
is signi…cantly positive. The optimal tax rate on capital is 36%, in conjunction
with a progressive labor income tax code that is, to a …rst approximation, a ‡at
tax of 23% with a deduction that corresponds to about $6;000 (relative to an
average income of households in the model of $35;000).
What explains these results? In our life cycle economy those contributing
most to tax revenue are middle-aged individuals which are both highly pro-
ductive in their jobs (and hence have high labor income) and in the middle of
accumulating savings for retirement (and therefore pay the bulk of the capital
income tax bill). But these agents supply labor quite elastically, whereas their
saving choices (which at their age is mainly life cycle saving rather than precau-
tionary saving due to idiosyncratic income shocks) is fairly inelastic with respect
to the marginal capital income tax rate.3 As a corollary, the capital income tax
is substantial; in fact, substantially higher at the margin than the labor income
tax. A decomposition analysis demonstrates that to a …rst order, high capital
income taxes arise even in a version of our model without idiosyncratic risk and
type heterogeneity, although heterogeneity as well as risk in labor productivity
contribute to its size. The magnitude of the progressivity of the labor income
tax code, on the other hand, depends crucially on the presence of these model
elements.
Since one would expect our …ndings, especially with respect to the high
capital income tax, to depend crucially on the exact speci…cation of household
preferences with respect to leisure (and thus the labor supply elasticity), we
investigate how sensitive our results are with respect to this speci…cation. Re-
placing the Cobb-Douglas utility speci…cation between consumption and leisure
which is often used in macroeconomics (and which we therefore employ as a
2Of course redistribution and insurance are two sides of the same medal: what is redistri-
bution between households of di¤erent abilities ex post (after ability is realized) is insurance
against low ability ex ante (before birth).
3Saez (2003) carries out an empirical investigation into the link between marginal taxes
and income elasticity of the rich. His estimated elasticities are in line with the elasticities
we compute in our model. Note that in models where households live forever the life cycle
savings motive, crucial in our model, is absent by construction.
3benchmark, but which implies a rather high labor supply elasticity) with a pref-
erence speci…cation which implies labor supply elasticities consistent with the
micro evidence (for males) delivers optimal tax rates on capital which are some-
what lower, but still signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. In particular, the optimal
capital income tax falls to 21%, and the optimal labor income tax schedule is
roughly a ‡at tax of 34% with deduction of now $9;000: Thus our main …nding
of a signi…cant capital income tax and a ‡at labor income tax with sizeable de-
duction is robust, but not surprisingly the exact mix between taxing capital and
labor income shifts towards higher labor income taxes with lower labor supply
elasticities.
Finally we demonstrate that even in our model it is possible to generate
optimal capital income taxes close to zero. However this result emerges only in
the rather uninteresting (and arguably unrealistic) case in which the government
accumulates so much negative debt (that is, it owns assets) in the steady state
that it can …nance almost all government outlays by interest earned on these
assets. In such a circumstance there is little need to generate any tax revenue,
and thus little need to raise revenue from capital income taxes.4
Besides contributing to the large literature on the optimal size of the capi-
tal income tax, our study is related to the literature on optimal taxation more
broadly, and to the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in particular.
Mirrlees (1971) characterizes the optimal tax code when the policy maker faces
a trade-o¤ between providing e¢cient incentives for household labor supply and
achieving an equitable after-tax income distribution. The studies by Mirrlees
(1974) and Varian (1980), recently extended to an environment in which house-
holds can save by Reiter (2004), replace the policy maker’s concern for equity
by an insurance motive; by making after-tax incomes less volatile, a progressive
tax system may provide partial income insurance among ex-ante identical house-
holds and thus may be called for even in the absence of ex-ante heterogeneity
of households and a public desire for equity.
We follow the tradition of this literature that explicitly models the policy
maker’s concerns for equity and insurance, and its trade-o¤ with providing the
right incentives for savings and labor supply decisions, but take a quantitative
approach. Previously, this strategy was adopted by Altig et al. (2001), Ventura
(1999), Castañeda et al. (1999), Domeij and Heathcote (2001) and Nishiyama
and Smetters (2005) in their positive analysis of fundamental tax reforms. On
the normative side, the contributions by Bohacek and Kejak (2004) and Conesa
and Krueger (2006) characterize the optimal progressivity of the income tax
code, without allowing this tax code to di¤erentiate between labor and capital
income. As such these papers cannot directly contribute to the discussion about
the optimal size of the capital income tax when capital taxes are an alternative
tool to provide redistribution/insurance.5 In work that is complementary toours
4This is still a nontrivial result since it is conceivable that positive labor income taxes
would be used to …nance subsidies for capital accumulation.
5Conesa and Krueger (2006) …nd an optimal tax code that is roughly a ‡at tax with
generous deduction and thus comes close to the proposal of Hall and Rabushka (1995). Saez
(2002) studies the optimal size of the deduction (and thus the optimal progressivity of the tax
4Smyth (2005) allows di¤erential tax treatments of labor and capital income and
characterizes the (potentially nonlinear) tax system that maximizes a weighted
sum of lifetime utility of all agents alive in the steady state. Since in his world
households are identical at birth, by construction his analysis also does not
capture a potentially positive, purely redistributive motive (in the sense used
in this paper) for capital and progressive labor taxation, but rather only its
insurance aspect.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the eco-
nomic environment and de…ne equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the calibration
of the model and section 4 explains the optimal tax experiments we are im-
plementing in the calibrated model. Results from our benchmark model are
presented in section 5, and section 6 contains a sensitivity analysis of our re-
sults with respect to the importance of uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk
and our utility speci…cation with respect to leisure. Finally, section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 The Economic Environment
The model we use is an extended version of the one used in Conesa and Krueger
(2006), augmented to allow for a meaningful distinction between capital and
labor income taxation.
2.1 Demographics
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by J overlapping generations. In
each period a continuum of new agents is born, whose mass grows at a constant
rate n. Each agent faces a positive probability of death in every period. Let
Ãj = prob(alive at j + 1jalive at j) denote the conditional survival probability
from age j to age j + 1: At age J agents die with probability one, i.e. Ã J = 0:
Therefore, even in the absence of altruistic bequest motives, in our economy a
fraction of the population leaves (unintended) bequests. These are denoted by
Trt and redistributed in a lump-sum fashion across individuals currently alive.
At a certain exogenous age jr, agents retire and start to receive social security
payments SSt every period, which are …nanced by proportional labor income
taxes ¿ ss;t, up to an income threshold ¹ y above which no further payroll taxes
are paid.
2.2 Endowments and Preferences
Individuals are endowed with one unit of productive time in each period of their
lives and enter the economy with no assets, besides transfers emanating from
accidental bequests. They spend their time supplying labor to a competitive
labor market or consuming leisure.
code) within the restricted set of ‡at tax systems with deduction.
5Individuals are heterogeneous along three dimensions that a¤ect their labor
productivity and hence their wage. First, agents of di¤erent ages di¤er in their
average, age-speci…c labor productivity "j, which will govern the average wage
of an age cohort. Retired agents (those with age j ¸ jr) by assumption are not
productive at all, i.e. "j = 0.
As a second source of heterogeneity we introduce group-speci…c di¤erences
in productivity, standing in for di¤erences in education and innate abilities. We
assume that agents are born as one of M possible ability types i 2 I; and that
this ability does not change over an agents’ lifetime, so that agents, after the
realization of their ability, di¤er in their current and future earnings potential.
The probability of being born with ability ®i is denoted by pi > 0: This feature
of the model, together with a social welfare function that values equity, gives a
welfare-enhancing role to redistributive …scal policies.
Finally, workers of same age and ability face idiosyncratic uncertainty with
respect to their individual labor productivity. Let ´ t 2 E denote a generic
realization of this idiosyncratic labor productivity uncertainty at period t: The
stochastic process for labor productivity status is identical and independent
across agents and follows a …nite-state Markov chain with stationary transitions
over time, i.e.
Qt(´;E) = P rob(´t+1 2 Ej´t = ´) = Q(´;E): (1)
We assume that Q consists of only strictly positive entries which assures that
there exists a unique, strictly positive, invariant distribution associated with Q
which we denote by ¦: All individuals start their life with average stochastic
productivity ¹ ´ =
P
´ ´¦(´), where ¹ ´ 2 E and ¦(´) is the probability of ´ under
the stationary distribution. Di¤erent realizations of the stochastic process then
give rise to cross-sectional productivity, income and wealth distributions that
become more dispersed as a cohort ages. In the absence of explicit insurance
markets for labor productivity risk a progressive tax system may be an e¤ective,
publicly administered tool to share this idiosyncratic risk across agents.
At any given time individuals are characterized by (at;´t;i;j), where at is
asset holdings (of one period, risk-free bonds), ´t is stochastic labor productivity
status at date t;i is ability type and j is age. An agent of type (at;´t;i;j)
deciding to work `j hours commands pre-tax labor income "j®i´ t`jwt; where
wt is the wage per e¢ciency unit of labor. Let ©t(at;´t;i;j) denote the measure
of agents of type (at;´t;i;j) at date t.
Preferences over consumption and leisure fcj;(1 ¡ `j)gJ
j=1 are assumed to
be representable by a standard time-separable utility function of the form:
E
8
<
:
J X
j=1
¯
j¡1u(cj;1¡ `j)
9
=
;
; (2)
where ¯ is the time discount factor. We discuss the exact form of the period
utility function u below. Expectations are taken with respect to the stochastic
processes governing idiosyncratic labor productivity and the time of death.
62.3 Technology
We assume that the aggregate technology can be represented by a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function. The aggregate resource constraint is given
by:
Ct + Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)Kt + Gt · AK ®
t N
1¡®
t (3)
where Kt, Ct and Nt represent the aggregate capital stock, aggregate consump-
tion and aggregate labor input (measured in e¢ciency units) in period t, and
® denotes the capital share. The calibration constant A normalizes units in
our economy6, and the depreciation rate for physical capital is denoted by ±.
As standard with a constant returns to scale technology and perfect competi-
tion, without loss of generality we assume the existence of a representative …rm
operating this technology.
2.4 Government Policy
The government engages in three activities in our economy: it absorbs resources
as government spending, it levies taxes and it runs a balanced budget social se-
curity system. The social security system is de…ned by bene…ts SSt for each
retired household, independent of that household’s earnings history. Social se-
curity taxes are levied up to a maximum labor income level ¹ y, as in the actual
U.S. system. The payroll tax rate ¿ ss;t is set to assure period-by-period budget
balance of the system. We take the social security system as exogenously given
and not as subject of optimization of the policy maker.
Furthermore the government faces a sequence of exogenously given govern-
ment consumption fGtg1
t=1 and has three …scal instruments to …nance this ex-
penditure. First it levies a proportional tax ¿c;t on consumption expenditures,
which we also take as exogenously given in our analysis. Second, the govern-
ment taxes capital income of households, rt(a+ Trt) according to a potentially
progressive capital income tax schedule T K: As it turns out, we …nd optimal
a constant marginal capital tax rate ¿K;t, and the progressivity is introduced
through labor income taxation. Here rt denotes the risk free interest rate, a
denotes asset held by the household, and Trt denotes transfers from accidental
bequests. Finally, the government can tax each individual’s taxable labor in-
come according to a potentially progressive labor income tax schedule T. De…ne
as
ypt = wt®i"j´`t (4)
a household’s pre-tax labor income, where wt denotes the wage per e¢ciency
unit of labor. A part of this pre-tax labor income is accounted for by the part
of social security contributions paid by the employer
esst = 0:5¿ ss;t minfypt; ¹ yg (5)
6We decided to abstract from technological progress, since we will be considering prefer-
ence speci…cations that are not consistent with the existence of a balanced growth path, but
allow us to endow households with a labor supply elasticity consistent in magnitude with
microeconometric evidence.
7which is not part of taxable income under current U.S. tax law. Thus we de…ne
as taxable labor income
yt =
½
ypt ¡ esst if j < jr
0 if j ¸ jr
(6)
We impose the following restrictions on labor and capital income taxes.
First, tax rates cannot be personalized as we are assuming anonymity of the
tax code. Second, the capital income tax is a proportional tax, as described
above. Labor income taxes, in contrast, can be made an arbitrary function
of individual taxable labor income in a given period. We denote the tax code
by T(¢); where T(y) is the labor income tax liability if taxable labor income
equals y: Our investigation of the optimal tax code then involves …nding the
labor income tax function T and the capital tax rate ¿ K that maximizes social
welfare, de…ned by a particular social welfare function speci…ed below.
Finally, notice that we do not allow for government debt. We will maintain
this assumption both in the benchmark economy and in our baseline scenario for
…nding the optimal tax schedules. We postpone the introduction of government
debt to the sensitivity analysis and the discussion of the corresponding results
in section 6.2.
2.5 Market Structure
We assume that workers cannot insure against idiosyncratic labor income un-
certainty by trading explicit insurance contracts. Also annuity markets insuring
idiosyncratic mortality risk are assumed to be missing. However, agents trade
one-period risk free bonds to self-insure against the risk of low labor produc-
tivity in the future. The possibility of self-insurance is limited, however, by
the assumed inability of agents to sell the bond short; that is, we impose a
stringent borrowing constraint upon all agents. In the presence of survival un-
certainty, this feature of the model prevents agents from dying in debt with
positive probability.7
2.6 De…nition of Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we will de…ne a competitive equilibrium and a stationary equi-
librium. Individual state variables are individual asset holdings a, individual
labor productivity status ´; individual ability type i and age j. The aggregate
state of the economy at time t is completely described by the joint measure ©t
over asset positions, labor productivity status, ability and age.
7If agents were allowed to borrow up to a limit, it may be optimal for an agent with a
low survival probability to borrow up to the limit, since with high probability she would not
have to pay back this debt. Clearly, such strategic behavior would be avoided if lenders could
provide loans at di¤erent interest rates, depending on survival probabilities (i.e. age). In
order to keep the asset market structure simple and tractable we therefore decided to prevent
agents from borrowing altogether, in line with much of the incomplete markets literature in
macroeconomics; see Aiyagari (1994) or Krusell and Smith (1998) for representative examples.
8Therefore let a 2 R+, ´ 2 E = f´1;´2;:::;´ng, i 2 I = f1;:::;Mg,
j 2 J = f1;2;:::Jg, and let S = R+ £ E £ I£ J. Let B(R+) be the Borel
¾ -algebra of R+ and P(E), P(I); P(J) the power sets of E;I and J, re-
spectively. Let M be the set of all …nite measures over the measurable space
(S;B(R+) £ P(E) £ P(I) £ P(J)).
De…nition 1 Given a sequence of social security replacement rates fbtg1
t=1;
consumption tax rates f¿c;tg1
t=1 and government expenditures fGtg1
t=1 and ini-
tial conditions K1 and ©1; a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of functions
for the household, fvt;ct;a0
t;`t : S ! R+g
1
t=1; of production plans for the …rm,
fNt;Ktg1
t=1; government labor income tax functions fTt : R+ ! R+g
1
t=1, capi-
tal income taxes f¿ K;tg1
t=1; social security taxes f¿ss;tg1
t=1 and bene…ts fSStg1
t=1;
prices fwt;rtg1
t=1; transfers fTrtg1
t=1; and measures f©tg1
t=1; with ©t 2 M such
that:
1. given prices, policies, transfers and initial conditions, for each t, vt solves
the functional equation (with ct, a0
t and `t as associated policy functions):
vt(a;´;i;j) = max
c;a0;`
fu(c;`) + ¯Ãj
Z
vt+1(a
0;´
0;i;j + 1)Q(´;d´
0)g (7)
subject to8
c+a
0 = wt"j®i´`¡¿ss;t minfwt"j®i´`; ¹ yg+(1+rt(1¡¿K;t))(a+Trt)¡Tt[yt]; for j < jr;
(8)
c + a
0 = SSt + (1 + rt(1 ¡ ¿K;t))(a + Trt);for j ¸ jr; (9)
a0 ¸ 0;c ¸ 0;0 · ` · 1: (10)
2. Prices wt and rt satisfy:
rt = ®A
µ
Nt
Kt
¶1¡®
¡ ±; (11)
wt = (1 ¡ ®)A
µ
Kt
Nt
¶®
: (12)
3. The social security policies satisfy
¿ss;t
Z
minfwt®i"j´`t; ¹ yg©t(da£d´£di£dj) = SSt
Z
©t(da£d´£di£fjr;:::;Jg):
(13)
4. Transfers are given by:
Trt+1 =
Z
(1 ¡ Ãj)a
0
t(a;´;i;j)©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) (14)
8Taxable labor income yt was de…ned above.
95. Government budget balance:
Gt =
Z
¿ K;trt(a + Trt)©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) +
Z
Tt[yt]©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) +
¿c;t
Z
ct(a;´;i;j)©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) (15)
6. Market clearing:
Kt =
Z
a©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) (16)
Nt =
Z
"j®i´`t(a;´;i;j)©t(da £ d´ £ di £ dj) (17)
Z
ct(a;´;i;j)©t(da£d´£di£dj)+
Z
a0
t(a;´;i;j)©t(da£d´£di£dj)+Gt =
AK
®
t N
1¡®
t + (1 ¡ ±)Kt (18)
7. Law of Motion:
©t+1 = Ht(©t) (19)
where the function Ht : M ! M can be written explicitly as:
(a) for all J such that 1= 2J :
©t+1(A£E£I£J ) =
Z
Pt((a;´;i;j);A£E£I£J )©t(da£d´£di£dj)
(20)
where
Pt((a;´;i;j);A£E£I£J) =
½
Q(e;E)Ãj
0
if a0
t(a;´;i;j) 2 A;i 2 I;j + 1 2 J
else
(21)
(b)
©t+1((A£E£I£f1g) = (1+n)
t
½ P
i2I pi
0
if 0 2 A;¹ ´ 2 E
else (22)
De…nition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which per
capita variables and functions as well as prices and policies are constant, and
aggregate variables grow at the constant growth rate of the population n.
3 Functional Forms and Calibration of the Bench-
mark Economy
In order to carry out the numerical determination of the optimal tax code in
our model we …rst have to choose a model parameterization. We now describe
our choices to that e¤ect.
103.1 Demographics
In our model households are born at age twenty, corresponding to model age
1: They become unproductive and hence retire at model age 46 (age 65 in real
time) and die with probability 1 at model age 81 (age 100 in the real world).
The population grows at an annual rate of n = 1:1%; the long-run average in
the U.S. Finally our model requires conditional survival probabilities from age j
to age j +1; Ãj; which we take from the study by Bell and Miller (2002). Table
I summarizes our choices of demographic parameters.
Table I: Demographics Parameters
Parameter Value Target
Retir. Age: jr 46 (65) Compul. Ret. (assumed)
Max. Age: J 81 (100) Certain Death (assumed)
Surv. Prob. Ãj Bell and Miller (2002) Data
Pop. Growth: n 1:1% Data
3.2 Preferences
Households have time-separable preferences over consumption and leisure and
discount the future with factor ¯: Because our results, and especially the intu-
ition for our results, will point to the labor supply elasticity as an important
determinant of our …ndings we consider two speci…cations of the period utility
function. As benchmark we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas speci…cation
u(c;1 ¡ `) =
¡
c°(1¡ `)1¡°¢1¡¾
1¡ ¾
(23)
where ° is a share parameter determining the relative importance of consump-
tion, and ¾ determines the risk aversion of the household.9 We set ¾ = 4 and
choose ¯ and ° such that the stationary equilibrium of the economy with bench-
mark tax system (as described below) features a capital-output ratio of 2:7 and
an average share of time worked of one-third of the time endowment (which
we normalized to 1).10 The resulting preference parameters are summarized in
Table II.
9The coe¢cient of relative risk aversion is given by
¡
cucc
uc
= ¾° +1¡ °
which should be kept in mind when interpreting our parameter choices.
10It is understood that in a general equilibrium model like ours all parameters a¤ect all
equilibrium quantities and prices. In our discussion of the calibration weassociate aparameter
with that equilibrium entity it a¤ects most, in a quantitative sense.
11Table II: Preferences Parameters
Parameter Value Target
¯ 1:001 K=Y = 2:7
¾ 4:0 Fixed
° 0:377 Avg Hours= 1
3
This preference speci…cation has been criticized as implying a Frisch labor
supply elasticity that is thought to be too high relative to what empirical stud-
ies estimate from labor market data (see e.g. Browning et al., 1999). In the
literature the Frisch elasticity is meant to capture the magnitude of the substi-
tution e¤ect. In Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) the Frisch elasticity is de…ned
as the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage, holding constant the
marginal utility of wealth. In our case it takes a value around 1, while in some
other applications it is computed as the elasticity of labor supply holding con-
stant the level of consumption (in our case, since preferences are non-separable
in consumption and leisure, this calculation gives a di¤erent value, around 2).
Usually the microeconometric studies restrict attention to white males of prime
age already employed and obtain values for the Frisch elasticity smaller than
one.
It is not obvious what the relevant labor supply elasticity should be. It
seems reasonable to think that the labor supply elasticity might be higher than
the low estimates implied by traditional microeconometric studies, because of
both higher labor supply elasticities of females and the existence of an extensive
margin that is not usually considered in the empirical estimation of labor supply
elasticities. Heckman (1993) argues that the elasticity of participation decisions
is large. In fact, most of the movement in aggregate hours worked is due to
this extensive margin. Also, Imai and Keane (2004) argue that the individual
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply is higher than usually
estimated in a framework with endogenous human capital accumulation (i.e.
learning-by-doing), possibly as high as 3.82. Domeij and Floden (2006) have
shown both theoretically and empirically that the presence of uninsurable la-
bor income risk and borrowing constraints biases the estimated individual labor
supply elasticities downwards. Finally, Kimball and Shapiro (2005) use prefer-
ences that are homothetic in hours worked (rather than in leisure) where the
substitution and income e¤ects exactly cancel each other and obtain a Frisch
labor supply elasticity around 1, which is the one implied in our benchmark
economy.
Notice also that the previous discussion refers to the Frisch labor supply
elasticity, which measures only the substitution e¤ect. With our benchmark
preferences households with zero wealth would not change hours worked in re-
action to changes in the wage (or its marginal tax rate), and the labor supply
elasticity increases with the level of wealth of the household.
Given these di¢culties to empirically pin down the labor supply elasticity
appropriate for our model, with the goal of providing sensitivity analysis we also
consider an alternative preference speci…cation that allows us to choose higher
12elasticities than in our benchmark preference speci…cation. In this alternative
speci…cation intratemporal preferences are represented by
u(c;1¡ `) =
c1¡¾1
1¡ ¾1
+ Â
(1 ¡ `)1¡¾2
1 ¡ ¾2
(24)
We discuss the calibration of the curvature parameters ¾1;¾2 and the share
parameter Â when we use this speci…cation in section 6.1.
3.3 Labor Productivity Process
Households start their life with no assets beyond the transfers induced by un-
intended bequests from those deceased at the end of last period. In addition,
they are endowed with one unit of time in each period. If households work they
have a labor productivity that depends on three components: a deterministic
age-dependent component "j; a type-dependent …xed e¤ect ®i and a stochastic,
persistent, idiosyncratic shock ´. Thus the natural logarithm of wages of an
individual is given by
log(wt) + log("j) + log(®i) + log(´) (25)
The age-productivity pro…le f"jg
jr¡1
j=1 is taken from Hansen (1993). We con-
sider two ability types, with equal population mass pi = 0:5 and …xed e¤ects
®1 = e¡¾® and ®2 = e¾a; so that E(log(®i)) = 0 and V ar(log(®i)) = ¾2
®:
Furthermore, we specify the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic part of log-
wages as a discretized version, with seven states, of a simple AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ½ and unconditional variance ¾2
´: This choice gives
us the three free parameters (¾2
®;½;¾2
´) to choose. With their choice we target
three statistics from data measuring how cross-sectional labor income dispersion
evolves over the life cycle. In particular, Storesletten et al. (2004) document
that i) at cohort age 22 the cross-sectional variance of household labor income
is about 0:2735; ii) at age 60 it is about 0:9 and iii) that it increases roughly
linearly in between. In our model labor supply and therefore labor earnings
are endogenous, responding optimally to the labor productivity process. We
choose the three parameters (¾ 2
®;½;¾2
´) so that in the benchmark parameteriza-
tion the model displays a cross-sectional household age-earnings variance pro…le
consistent with the three facts just cited. The implied parameter values for
our benchmark preference speci…cation are summarized in Table III. Note that,
evidently, these parameters have to be re-calibrated if the alternative preference
speci…cation is being used.
Table III: Labor Productivity
Parameter Value Target
¾2
® 0:14 V ar(y22)
½ 0:98 Lin. Incr. in V ar(yj)
¾2
´ 0:0289 V ar(y60)
133.4 Technology
The production side of our model is completely standard. Therefore the cap-
ital share parameter ® in the Cobb-Douglas production function is set to the
empirical capital share, ® = 0:36; a standard value chosen in the real business
cycle and public …nance literature.11 The depreciation rate is set to match an
investment-output ratio of 25:5% in the data (where investment includes non-
residential and residential …xed investment as well as investment into consumer
durables). This requires ± = 8:3%: Technology parameters are summarized in
Table IV.
Table IV: Technology Parameters
Parameter Value Target
® 0:36 Data
± 8:33% I=Y = 25:5%
A 1 Normalization
3.5 Government Policies and the Income Tax Function
The government consumes resources, collects tax revenues and operates a social
security system. The focus of our analysis of the government is the income tax
code. We therefore take the other parts of government activity as exogenously
given and calibrate the extent of these activities to observed data. We calibrate
government spending G such that it accounts for 17% of GDP in the initial
stationary equilibrium. Note that we keep G constant across our tax exper-
iments; therefore if an income tax system di¤erent from the one speci…ed as
benchmark delivers higher output in equilibrium, the corresponding G
Y ratio in
that equilibrium is reduced.
Part of tax revenues are generated by aproportional consumption tax, whose
size we take as exogenous to our analysis. We set ¿c = 5%; following Mendoza et
al. (1994). In addition to taxes and spending the government runs a pay-as-you-
go social security system, de…ned by a payroll tax. The payroll tax takes a value
of 12:4% of labor income up to an upper bound of $87;000. Bene…ts are then
determined by budget balance of the social security system in the benchmark
economy.
We want to determine the optimal income tax function. Ideally one would
impose no restrictions on the set of potential tax functions the government can
choose from. Maximization over such an unrestricted set is computationally
infeasible, however. Therefore we restrict the set of tax functions to a ‡exible
three parameter family. If y is taxable income (either labor income or capital
income or the sum of both), then total taxes paid on that income is given by
T GS(y;a0;a1;a2) = a0
³
y ¡ (y¡a1 + a2)
¡ 1
a1
´
(26)
11For example, Castañeda et al. (1999) choose ® = 0:376and Domeij and Heathcote use
® = 0:36 in their studies of (capital) income taxation.
14where (a0;a1;a2) are parameters. This functional form has been proposed by
Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and has been employed in the quantitative public
…nance literature by Castañeda et al. (1999), Smyth (2005) and Conesa and
Krueger (2006). Roughly speaking, a0 controls the level of the average tax
rate whereas a1 determines the progressivity of the tax code. For a1 ! 0 the
tax system reduces to a pure ‡at tax system, while other parameterizations
encompass a wide range of progressive and regressive tax functions.
Without discriminating between capital and labor income Gouveia and Strauss
(1994) estimate the parameters (a0;a1;a2) that best approximate actual taxes
paid under the actual US income tax system of a0 = 0:258 and a1 = 0:768: We
use as benchmark tax system, used for calibration and comparison purposes,
the tax code implied by their estimates, applied to the sum of labor and capital
income. The parameter a2 is then used to insure government budget balance.12
The benchmark tax system is summarized in Table V.
Table V: Policy Parameters
Parameter Value
¿c 5%
a0 0:258
a1 0:768
¿ss 12:4%
4 The Computational Experiment
Once our model is fully parameterized we can determine the optimal tax code.
For this we need to specify the set of tax functions considered and the objective
function of the government. De…ne yl and yk as taxable labor and capital
income, respectively. The set of tax functions we consider is given by
T =
©
Tl(yl);Tk(yk) : Tl(yl) = T GS(yl;a0;a1;a2) and Tk(yk) = ¿kyk
ª
(27)
and thus by the four parameters (a0;a1;a2;¿k), out of which we will maximize
over three and use a2 to adjust in order to insure budget balance. That is,
we allow for a ‡exible labor income tax code, but restrict capital taxes to be
proportional, an assumption that assures computational feasibility and makes
the comparison to existing studies employing the same assumption easier. Also
note that the choices of (a0;a1;¿k) are restricted by the requirement that there
has to exist a corresponding a2 that balances the budget.
The remaining ingredient of our analysis is the social welfare function ranking
di¤erent tax functions. We assume that the government wants to maximize the
ex-ante lifetime utility of an agent being born into a stationary equilibrium
12Note that the parameter a2 is not invariant to units of measurement: if one scales all
variables by a …xed factor, one has to adjust the parameter a2 in order to preserve the same
tax function.
15implied by the chosen tax function. Formally the government’s objective is
given by
SWF (a0;a1;¿ k) =
Z
v(a0;a1;¿k)(a = 0;´ = ¹ ´;i;j = 1)d©(a0;a1;¿k)
=
1
2
2 X
i=1
v(a0;a1;¿k)(0;¹ ´;i;1) (28)
where we used the facts that the two types are of equal mass and everyone starts
life with no …nancial assets and at the average stochastic labor productivity
level. Here v(a0;a1;¿k) and ©(a0;a1;¿k) are the value function and invariant cross-
sectional distribution associated with tax system characterized by (a0;a1;¿ k):
5 Results
5.1 The Optimal Tax System
We determine as optimal tax system a(marginal and average) tax rate on capital
of ¿ k = 36% and a labor income tax characterized by the parameters a0 = 23%
and a1 ¼ 7: This implies that the labor income tax code is basically a ‡at
tax with marginal rate of 23% and a deduction of about $6;000 (relative to an
average income of $35;000). Consequently we …nd that taxing capital is not only
a good idea, but taxing it substantially and more heavily than labor income is
optimal for a government that is benevolent and maximizes a utilitarian social
welfare function.
We performed several exercises to evaluate whether it would be welfare en-
hancing to introduce progressivity of the capital income tax schedule as well, by
introducing a deduction. It was not, and according to our results all progres-
sivity of the tax code should be embedded in the labor income tax schedule.13
5.2 Comparison with the Benchmark
In order to assess the importance of the tax code for equilibrium allocations
in our model and to obtain a …rst understanding for the causes of high capital
income taxes we now compare selected equilibrium statistics for the optimal and
the benchmark tax system. Table VI contains a summary of the basic …ndings.
13The restrictions placed on the tax code in (27) already anticipate this result.
16Table VI: Comparison across Tax Codes
Variable BENCH. OPTIMAL
Average Hours Worked 0:333 ¡0:56%
Total Labor Supply N ¡¡ ¡0:11%
Capital Stock K ¡¡ ¡6:64%
Output Y ¡¡ ¡2:51%
Aggregate Consumption C ¡¡ ¡1:63%
Gini Coef. for Wealth 0:636 0:659
Gini Coef. for Consumption 0:273 0:269
ECV ¡¡ 1:33%
We observe that under the optimal tax system capital drops substantially
below the level of the benchmark economy. Consequently aggregate output
and aggregate consumption fall as well. This is an immediate consequence of
the heavy tax on capital income in the optimal tax system, relative to the
benchmark (where the highest marginal tax rate is 25.8%). The change in taxes
also induces adjustments in labor supply, an e¤ect that is quite small in the
aggregate, however.
5.2.1 Decomposition of the Welfare E¤ects
Given the substantial decline in aggregate consumption and the modest decline
in average hours worked in the optimal tax system, relative to the benchmark,
it is at …rst sight surprising that the optimal tax system features substantially
higher aggregate welfare, equivalent to an increase of 1:33% of consumption at
all ages, and all states of the world, keeping labor supply allocations unchanged.
Therefore it is useful to decompose these welfare gains into several components.
Given the form of the utility function, the steady state welfare consequences of
switching from a consumption-labor allocation (c0;l0) to (c¤;l¤) are given by
CEV =
·
W(c¤;l¤)
W(c0;l0)
¸ 1
°(1¡¾)
¡ 1 (29)
where W(c;l) = SWF(a0;a1;¿ k) is the expected lifetime utility at birth of a
household, given a tax system (a0;a1;¿ k): We can decompose CEV into two
components, one stemming from the change in consumption from c0 to c¤; and
one from the change in leisure. Furthermore, the consumption impact on welfare
can be further divided into a part that captures the change in average consump-
tion, and one part that re‡ects the change in the distribution of consumption
(across types, across the life cycle and across states of the world). The same is
true for labor supply (leisure).14
14Let CEVC and CEVL be de…ned as
W(c¤;l0) = W(c0(1+ CEVC);l0)
W(c¤;l¤) = W(c¤(1 +CEVL);l0):
17Table VII presents the results of this decomposition. It shows that, following
this distribution, the welfare gains stem from a better allocation of consumption
across types and states of the world, and from a reduction of the average time
spent working. This more than o¤sets the lower average level of consumption
and the fact that, due to the lower marginal tax rates for highly productive
agents, labor supply becomes more unevenly distributed.
Table VII: Decomposition of Welfare
Total Change 1:33%
Consumption
8
<
:
Total
Level
Distribution
1:29%
¡1:63%
2:97%
Leisure
8
<
:
Total
Level
Distribution
0:04%
0:41%
¡0:37%
Then it is easy to verify that
1+CEV = (1 +CEVC)(1+ CEVL) or
CEV ¼ CEVC +CEVL
We further decompose CEVC into a consumption level e¤ect CEVCL and a consumption
distribution e¤ect CEVCD:
W(^ c0;l0) = W(c0(1+ CEVCL);l0)
W(c¤;l0) = W(^ c0(1+ CEVCD);l0)
where
^ c0 = (1+ gC)c0 =
C¤
C0
c0
is the consumption allocation resulting from scaling the allocation c0 by the change in aggre-
gate consumption
C¤
C0: A simple calculation shows that the consumption level e¤ect simply
equals the growth rate of consumption:
CEVCL =
C¤
C0
¡1
Similarly, for leisure we de…ne
W(c¤;^ l0) = W(c¤(1+ CEVLL);l0)
W(c¤;l¤) = W(c¤(1+ CEVLD);^ l0):
where 1¡^ l0 is the leisure allocation derived from l0 by scaling it by the change in aggregate
leisure:
1¡^ l0 =
1¡L¤
1¡L0
(1 ¡l0):
Again it is easy to verify that the leisure level e¤ect is given by
CEVLL = (1+gLE)
°
1¡° ¡ 1:
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Figure 1: Asset Accumulation over the Life Cycle
5.2.2 Life Cycle Pro…les of Assets, Labor Supply and Taxes
In order to further document who mainly bears the burden of the income tax
and how a change in the tax code changes this distribution, in this section we
discuss life cycle patterns of asset holdings (the relevant tax base for the capital
income tax) and labor income (the relevant tax base for labor income taxes).
In …gure 1 we display the average asset holdings over the life cycle for both
productivity types of households, both for the benchmark and for the optimal
tax system. First, we observe the hump-shaped behavior of assets that is typical
of any life cycle model. This, in particular, implies that indeed the main burden
of the capital income tax is borne by households aged 40 to 70. Second, it is
clearly visible how asset accumulation is a¤ected by the higher capital income
taxes implied by the optimal, relative to the benchmark tax system, most point-
edly for the 40 to 60 year old. This explains the overall decline of assets and
thus capital, relative to the benchmark, of 6:6%:
Figure 2 documents the average life cycle pattern of labor supply of both
skill groups for the benchmark and the optimal tax code. We observe that the
optimal tax code induces the life cycle pattern of labor supply to be tilted to-
wards higher labor supply at ages at which the households are more productive.
The lower labor income taxes and the sizeable deduction make an allocation of
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Figure 2: Labor Supply over the Life Cycle
labor supply that follows more closely the age-e¢ciency pro…le optimal, as it
alleviates the severity of the borrowing constraint early in life. Especially for
the low-skilled group the increase in labor supply at age 50 to 60 is substantial,
indicating a high labor supply elasticity with respect to marginal labor income
taxes for this group.
As …gure 3 indicates, the change in the life cycle pattern of labor supply
induces changes in average labor income by age, shifting labor income somewhat
towards older ages. In the optimal even more so than in the benchmark tax
system it is this 40 to 60 year olds that pay most of these taxes.
This is exactly what …gure 4 documents which displays average taxes paid,
both for the benchmark and the optimal tax code, over the life cycle. It demon-
strates that the optimal tax code leads to substantially more redistribution
across types, by taxing more heavily the high-skilled, high labor income-earners
which also hold a large fraction of …nancial assets in the economy, especially
at ages 40 to 60. The substantially higher capital income taxes of the optimal
tax system, relative to the benchmark, explains why these wealthy individuals
(see …gure 1) pay a larger tax bill in the optimal tax system. The same is (very
pronouncedly) true for retired capital holders.
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Figure 3: Labor Income over the Life Cycle
5.3 Model Elements and the Structure of the Optimal Tax
Code
To further isolate the driving forces for our two main quantitative results, a
signi…cantly positive capital income tax and a labor income tax schedule that
features progressivity through asubstantial deduction we now show which model
elements are responsible for these …ndings. Table VII summarizes the optimal
tax code (under the benchmark calibration) in four versions of our model.15 The
…rst model abstracts from any heterogeneity in productivity (deterministic or
stochastic) and allows agents to fully insure mortality risk, which is equivalent
to abstracting from mortality risk altogether.16
Into this standard OLG model without heterogeneity or idiosyncratic risk we
then introduce, step by step, …rst uninsurable mortality risk (economy E2), the
in addition type heterogeneity (economy E3) and …nally idiosyncratic produc-
tivity risk (economy E4, which corresponds to our benchmark model analyzed
so far).
15Across the alternative models, the optimization is over the ‡at capital income tax rate ¿ k
and the progressive labor income tax given by the proportional rate ¿ l with a deduction d.
16Introducing annuities has the advantage, relative to setting mortality risk to zero, that it
does not change the population structure in the economy.
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Table VII: Optimal Tax Code in 4 Models
Model Elements E1 E2 E3 E4
Annuities Yes No No No
Idiosyncr. Productivity Shocks No No No Y es
Type Heterogeneity No No Y es Y es
¿k 36:5% 29:7% 32:0% 36:0%
¿l 16:0% 19:4% 18:3% 23:0%
d $0 $0 $3;200 $6;000
We observe that the high capital income tax is a common feature of all
four models and therefore owes to the life cycle structure of the OLG model, in
which the crucial driving forces are life cycle saving and labor supply choices, as
discussed above.17 The second main observation of table VII is that both ex-ante
heterogeneity (the social redistribution motive) as well as ex-post productivity
risk (the socialinsurance motive) alonecontribute (in roughly equal proportions)
to the optimal extent of labor tax progressivity as well as to the optimal size
of the capital income tax (comparing economy E2 to E3; and economy E3
to E4). To summarize and simply put, the life cycle structure of our model
17We discuss the relation of our results to the theoretical …ndings on optimal capital taxation
in OLG models by Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003) further in section 6.2.
22mainly drives the high capital income tax result whereas ability heterogeneity
and idiosyncratic risk determine the extent of labor tax progressivity.
6 Sensitivity Analysis and Interpretation of the
Results
Since our results are quantitative rather than theoretical in nature we now
perform several exercises and sensitivity analysis in order to understand the
underlying reasons for our high capital income tax result.
6.1 The Case of Separable Preferences
Our previous argument for substantially positive capital income taxes was based
on the …nding that those individuals contributing most to the tax receipts of
the government have a high labor supply elasticity. In this section we want to
investigate whether our …ndings are robust to a di¤erent preference speci…cation
that allows us to control this labor supply elasticity directly. We employ a utility
function of the form given in (24): We choose as parameters a coe¢cient of
relative risk aversion of ¾1 = 2 and ¾2 = 3: This implies a substantial reduction
in the Frisch labor supply elasticity relative to the benchmark calibration, so
that now this elasticity is below one.18 For the remaining preference parameters
(¯;Â) as well as the other model parameters we follow the same calibration
strategy as above; Table VIII summarizes the new preference parameters.19
Table VIII: Preferences Parameters
Parameter Value Target
¯ 0:9717 K=Y = 2:7
¾1 2 Fixed
¾2 3 Fixed
Â 1:92 Avg Hours= 1
3
Under this new parameterization we …nd as optimal tax code a marginal
capital income tax of ¿k = 21% and a marginal labor income tax rate of a0 =
34% and a1 = 18; implying again a ‡at tax rate on labor with deduction of
now $9;000: So whereas the main qualitative …ndings of a signi…cantly positive
capital income tax and a ‡at labor income tax with sizeable deduction remains
intact, quantitatively a reduction in the labor supply elasticity shifts the optimal
tax mix towards lower capital taxation and higher labor taxation.
18With this preference speci…cation the Frisch labor supply elasticity is equal to 1
¾2 £ 1¡`
` =
2
3, while it was 1 in our benchmark economy.
19Of the other model parameters, themain changes in parameters occurredfor the ones char-
acterizing the labor productivityprocess; thenewchoices are (¾2
®,½,¾2
´) = (0:19;0:995;0:0841):
23Table IX repeats the comparison of aggregate statistics under the benchmark
and the optimal tax system, but now with the alternative preference speci…ca-
tion. Note that since we re-calibrate our economy with the new preference
structure the stationary equilibrium both with the benchmark tax system as
well as the optimal tax system di¤ers from the previous section (of course not
along those statistics that we calibrated to, but along all other dimensions).
Table IX: Comparison across Tax Codes
Variable BENCH. OPTIMAL
Average Hours Worked 0:333 0:324
Total Labor Supply N ¡¡ ¡2:14%
Capital Stock K ¡¡ ¡7:44%
Output Y ¡¡ ¡4:08%
Aggregate Consumption C ¡¡ ¡3:75%
Gini Coef. for Wealth 0:636 0:699
Gini Coef. for Consumption 0:277 0:271
ECV ¡¡ 3:4%
Qualitatively, the results are similar to the ones in the previous section.
Quantitatively, however, the decline in the capital stock, output, consumption,
and particular labor supply is more substantial than with nonseparable prefer-
ences. Also, the decline in consumption inequality is much more pronounced
now than previously, suggesting that with separable preferences the motives for
insurance and redistribution are even more crucial than before. Despite a much
more severe drop in aggregate consumption the welfare gains are higher now
than with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
6.2 Preferences Homothetic in Hours Worked and the Role
of Government Debt
Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga (2003) prove theoretically that the opti-
mal capital income tax in the steady state of an Overlapping Generation model
without idiosyncratic risk and type heterogeneity is zero if the tax schedule can
di¤er by household age or if preferences are homothetic in hours worked. In this
section we reconcile our results with their …ndings. We now employ their prefer-
ences and shut down idiosyncratic risk and type heterogeneity. The remaining
model di¤erences are that we include a PAYGO social security system, that we
do not allow for government debt and that our objective function (maximization
of ex-ante utility of a newborn) does not clearly map into the objective function
of a Ramsey problem (welfare of each subsequent generation weighted by some
social planner discount factor). We …nd that the capital income tax is still high,
in the order of 25%.20
20We also redid our quantitative exercise when abstracting from the PAYGO social security
system. In such an environment taxable income is signi…cantly higher, because of higher
24Only if we allow for negative government debt we recover the result of a zero
capital income tax. Quantitatively, negative government debt has to be as large
as two times GDP. Under such a scenario the government accumulates so many
assets and uses the return on those assets to pay for government expenditures
that it does not have to tax labor income signi…cantly either. In fact, the
welfare di¤erences across many alternative tax codes become quite small since
most of the government expenditure is already …nanced through the return on
government capital.
Notice that in his quantitative work Garriga (2003) demonstrates, for our
non-separable benchmark preference speci…cation, that for particular values of
the social discount factor of the Ramsey government the optimal steady state
capital income tax is zero, but with implied large negative government debt
positions. Our results are consistent with his …ndings.
Our conclusion from this section is that the ability of the government to run
(large) negative debt is a key ingredient for the optimality of zero capital income
taxes in OLG models. It is important to bear in mind that given our objective
function (ex-ante lifetime utility of a newborn in the steady state), the need
of the government to accumulate assets at the expense of private consumption
along the transition to the stationary equilibrium has no welfare consequences.
In Garriga (2003) only for high Pareto weights of the Ramsey government on
future generations such a policy turns out to be optimal, since only then the
increased welfare of future generations dominates the welfare losses associated
with the accumulation of government assets during the transition.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax code in a
large scale overlapping generations model where uninsurable heterogeneity and
income risk generates a desire for redistribution and social insurance. We …nd
that a system that taxes capital heavily and taxes labor income according to a
‡at tax with sizeable deduction is optimal in the long run.
The key driving force behind the capital income tax result is the life cycle
structure of our model, which implies that those who pay most of the taxes
mainly save for life-cycle reasons; a higher marginal capital income tax does not
a¤ect their savings behavior as drastically, as, say, in an in…nite horizon model
in the spirit of Aiyagari, where people save purely to smooth out unfavorable
productivity shocks. We also show, by employing a utility speci…cation with
lower implied labor supply elasticity of households that this elasticity is crucial
for the very large size of the optimal capital income tax, but not its existence.
With the alternative preference speci…cation it remains signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero. Finally, our results con…rm those of Conesa and Krueger (2006) in
showing that the optimal degree of progressivity of the labor income tax schedule
crucially depends on the presence of labor productivity heterogeneity (both
labor supply and higher capital accumulation. As a result the optimal capital income tax is
somewhat lower, but still a substantial 21%.
25deterministic and stochastic) and thus on the social desire for redistribution
and insurance.
Given our …ndings that the life cycle structure of our model in general, and
life cycle savings behavior in particular, appear crucial for our results, future
research should investigate how sensitive our …ndings are to a more detailed
modelling of institutions a¤ecting life-cycle savings incentives, especially the
social security system and its reform. In a similar vein, so far we have abstracted
from any linkage between generations due to bequest motives. It is conceivable,
in the light of the classical results on zero optimal capital taxation in fact likely,
that an incorporation of these elements into our model brings its implications
for the optimal tax code somewhat closer to these classical results. Until then
we conclude that taxing capital (heavily) may not be such a bad idea after all.
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